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Abstract. When users need to perform a digital activity, they evaluate available
systems according to their functionality, ease of use, QoS, and/or economical as-
pects. Recently, trust has become another key factor for such evaluation. Two
main issues arise in the trust management research community. First, how to de-
fine the trust in an entity, knowing that this can be a person, a digital or a physical
resource. Second, how to evaluate such value of trust in a system as a whole for
a particular activity. Defining and evaluating trust in systems is an open problem
because there is no consensus on the used approach. In this work we propose an
approach applicable to any kind of system. The distinctive feature of our pro-
posal is that, besides taking into account the trust in the different entities the user
depends on to perform an activity, it takes into consideration the architecture of
the system to determine its trust level. Our goal is to enable users to have a per-
sonal comparison between different systems for the same application needs and to
choose the one satisfying their expectations. This paper introduces our approach,
which is based on probability theory, and presents ongoing results.
1 Introduction
Everyday digital activities like chatting, mailing, blogging, buying online, and shar-
ing data are achieved through systems composed of physical and digital resources
(e.g., servers, software components, networks, data, and personal computers). These
resources are provided and controlled by persons (individual or legal entities) on whom
we depend to execute these activities. The set of entities and the different relations be-
tween them form a complex system for a specific activity.
When users need to choose a system to perform an activity, they evaluate it con-
sidering many criteria: functionality, ease of use, QoS, economical aspects, etc. Trust
is also a key factor of choice. However, evaluating this trustworthiness is a problematic
issue due to the system complexity.
Trust has been widely studied in several aspects of daily life. In the trust manage-
ment community [1,2,3,4,5,6], two main issues arise: (i) How to define the trust in an
entity, knowing that entities can be persons, digital and physical resources? Defining
the trust in each type of entity naturally is different but mainly depends on subjective
and objective properties [6]. (ii) How to evaluate such value of trust in a system under
a particular context? This point embodies the main focus of our study. We argue that
studying trust in the separate entities that compose a system does not give a picture of
how trustworthy a system is as a whole. Indeed, the trust in a system depends on its
architecture. Several types of trust have been proposed with different meanings, which
are strongly context-dependent. Defining and evaluating trust is still an open problem;
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there is no consensus on the approach applicable to systems in general. The aim of our
work is to propose an approach applicable to any kind of system.
Inspired by probability theory, the goal of this paper is to evaluate the trust value
in a system for an activity that a person wants to perform. The system definition is
based on SOCIOPATH [7] which allows to model the architecture of a system by taking
into account entities of the social and the digital world involved in an activity. To focus
on the trust in the system, the SOCIOPATH model is abstracted in a graph-based view.
Levels of trust are then defined for each node in the graph. By combining trust values,
we are able to estimate two different granularities of trust, namely, trust in a path and
trust in a system, both for an activity to be performed by a person. Our contribution
is named SOCIOTRUST, to evaluate it, we conducted several experiments to analyze
the impact of different characteristics of a system on the behavior of the obtained trust
values. Experiments realized on both synthetic traces and real data sets allow us to
validate the accuracy of our approach.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a quick overview of SOCIOPATH.
In Section 3, we propose SOCIOTRUST to compute the trust value in a system for an ac-
tivity. Section 4 presents the experiments that validate the proposed approach. Section 5
presents some related works. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Overview of SOCIOPATH
The SOCIOPATH meta-model [7] describes a system in terms of the entities that ex-
ist in (i) the social world 1, where persons own physical resources and data, and in (ii)
the digital world, where instances of data (including application programs) are stored
and artifacts (software) are running. SOCIOPATH also describes the relations between
the different entities of the two worlds. Enriched with deduction rules, the SOCIOPATH
meta-model allows to underline and discover chains of access relations between arti-
facts, and control relations between persons and digital resources in a system. The main
concepts defined in SOCIOPATH are:
– minimal path (σ̂); a list that begins with an actor, ends with a data instance and
contains artifacts in between. Between each two consecutive elements in this
list, there is a relation access. A minimal path describes a straight way an actor
achieves an activity without passing through cycles.
– activity (ω); a task like editing a document, where some restrictions are consid-
ered to impose the presence of particular elements in the path. For instance, if a
user wants to read a .doc document, she must use an artifact that can understand
this type of document (e.g., Microsoft Word or LibreOffice Writer).
Each artifact in the path is controlled by at least one person and supported by at
least one physical resource. In SOCIOPATH, the persons who control an artifact are the
persons who own a physical resource that supports the artifact or who own some data
represented by a data instance that supports the artifact (the providers).
Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of a simple system drawn using SO-
CIOPATH. Consider that a person John wants to achieve the activity “accessing the
1. The words in italic in this section refer to keywords in the SOCIOPATH meta-model
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00725098
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document toto using GoogleDocs”. In the social world, the person John owns some
Data, a PC and an iPad. Microsoft, Google and Apple are legal entities which pro-
vide resources and artifacts. Renater, Orange and SFR are French telecom companies.
John’s iPad is connected to SFR Servers and Renater Servers and John’s PC is
connected to Orange Servers. In the digital world, the operating system Windows is
running on John’s PC. Windows supports IExplorer. John’s iPad supports the run-
ning iOS, which supports the application Safari. John’s data are represented in the
digital world by the document toto that is supported by the physical resources owned
by Google. We consider Google Cloud as the storage system used by the application
GoogleDocs. By applying the SOCIOPATH rules on this example, we obtain the rela-
tions of access and control shown in Figure 1 where Jonh has the following minimal
paths to access toto:
σ̂1 ={John, Windows, IExplorer, ADSL Network, Google Cloud, GoogleDocs, toto}.
σ̂2 ={John, iOS, Safari, SFR Network, Google Cloud, GoogleDocs, toto}.
σ̂3 ={John, iOS, Safari, Professional Network, Google Cloud, GoogleDocs, toto}.
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Fig. 1: Graphical representation of a system for the activity “John accesses a document
toto on GoogleDoc” using SOCIOPATH
For simplicity sake, in the current paper we voluntary limit the digital activities to
those that can be represented using a straight path. We do not consider activities that
need multiple paths in parallel to be achieved. Most of the popular activities can be
illustrated this way, such as connecting to a search engine, consulting a web page, pub-
lishing a picture, editing a document, etc. In the next sections, “accessing a document”
is our illustrative activity.
3 Inferring the trust value of a system for an activity
In order to evaluate the trust level of a particular user in a system for a particular
activity, we first obtain a coarse-grained view of the system, from a SOCIOPATH model,
as a weighted directed acyclic graph (WDAG) (cf. Section 3.1). This graph represents
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the system allowed to perform the digital activity of the user. We then apply a proba-
bilistic approach on this graph (cf. Section 3.2) to calculate the trust level of a user in a
system for an activity achieved through the different paths in the graph.
3.1 A SOCIOPATH model as a weighted directed acyclic graph
We simplify the representation of SOCIOPATH by using only access and control
relations derived from SOCIOPATH rules. We combine an artifact, the set of persons
controlling it and the set of physical resources supporting it into one unique component.
These merged components are represented by the nodes in the WDAG. The edges in the
WDAG represent the relations’ access. A user performs an activity by passing through
successive access relations of the graph, so-called a path 2. A user who wants to achieve
an activity associates each node with a trust value. To summarize, a system that enables
a user to achieve an activity can be formally modeled as a tuple:
αω,P =< Nω,Aω, tω > where:
– P : the user who wants to achieve an activity.
– ω: the activity the user wants to achieve.
– Nω: the set of nodes in a system for an activity. Each node aggregates one artifact,
the persons who control it and the physical resources that support it.
– Aω ∈ Nω × Nω: the set of edges in a system. From the rules of SOCIOPATH and the
aggregation we made for a node, our WDAG exhibits only the relation access.
– tω : N → [0, 1]: a function that assigns to each node a trust level, which we as-
sume to be within the interval [0,1], where 0 means not trustworthy at all and 1
means fully trustworthy. The evaluation of these values differs from one person to
another. There are several ways to construct this trust level. We can figure out differ-
ent objective and subjective factors that impact this trust level like the reputation of
the persons who control the artifact, their skills, the performance of the physical re-
source that supports the artifact or the personal experience with this artifact. We thus
have tω(N) = f(tFω , t
P
ω , t
PR
ω ), where t
F
ω , t
P
ω , t
PR
ω are the trust value assigned to
an artifact F , the set of persons P who control F , the set of physical resources PR
which support F respectively for a given activity ω. The meaning of the resulting
trust value in a node depends on the employed function f to compute this value [8].
For instance, if Bayesian inference is employed to evaluate it as is done in [9], the
node trust value is considered as the probability by which a user believes that a node
can perform an expected action for a given activity [10]. However, in this work, we
do not address the issue of computing this value. Moreover, in this study, we suppose
that the edges are trustworthy, and we do not assign a level of trust to the edges.
Figure 2 shows the system presented in Figure 1 as a merged WDAG where each node
represents an artifact with all additional information as physical resources it depends
on and persons who control it, and each edge represents the relation accesses. The
associated value on the node represents the level of John’s trust in this node. The paths
that enable John to access toto become: σ1 ={A, C, E, H, I}; σ2 ={A, C, F, H,
I}; σ3 ={B, D, G, H, I}.
2. If there is no ambiguity, we denote a minimal path through the WDAG by simply a path σ.
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A={iOS,{iPad},{Apple,John}}
B={Windows,{PC},{Microsoft,John}}
C={Safari,{iPad},{Apple,John}}
D={IExplore,{PC},{Microsoft,John}}
E={SFR network,{SFR servers},{SFR}}
F={Professional Network,{Renater Servers},
{Renater}}
G={ADSL Network,{Orange Servers},
{Orange}}
H={GoogleCloud,{Google servers},{Google}}
I={GoogleDocs,{Google servers},{Google}}
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Fig. 2: The activity “John accesses a document toto on GoogleDoc” as a WDAG
3.2 SOCIOTRUST: A probabilistic approach to infer the system trust value
Gambetta in [10] argues that: When we say we trust someone or that someone is
trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that
is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging
in some form of cooperation with him. According to this argument, we can consider
the trust value as the probability, by which one party believes that another party can
perform an expected action in a certain situation [4].
We consider thus the following (Table 1 summarizes the notations used here).
– Trust in a node: The trust value of a user P in a node N for an activity ω is the
probability, by which P believes that N provides her the expected services for ω.
Then, we have t(N) = P(λN ).
– Trust in a path: The trust value of a user P in a path σ for an activity ω is the
probability, by which P believes that σ enables her to achieve ω. Then, we have
t(σ) = P(λσ).
– Trust in a system: The trust value of a user P in a system α for an activity ω is
the probability, by which P believes that α enables her to achieve ω. Then, we
have t(α) = P(λα).
We consider trust in a node, a path or a system as a value of probability. Hence,
probability theory is the used tool to obtain the formula of these probabilities, as we
show in the next section [11].
3.2.1 Trust in a path (formal evaluation): The trust level of a person in a path for an
activity is the probability that all the nodes that belong to this path provide the expected
services for the activity. Let σ = {N1, N2, . . . , Nn} be a path that enables a person P
to achieve an activity ω. The trust level of a person P to achieve an activity through
σ = {N1, N2, . . . , Nn} is the probability that all the nodes {Ni}i∈[1..n] provide the
expected services for the activity. Thus P(λσ) is computed as follows:
P(λσ) = P(λN1 ∧ λN2 ∧ . . . ∧ λNn)
The event λNi means that Ni provides the expected services for an activity. Since
the graph is acyclic, then the nodes N1, . . . , Nn are different in the path, thus each λNi
is independent from all others. Hence, we can rewrite the trust in a path as follows:
P(λσ) = P(λN1)×P(λN2)× . . .×P(λNn) =
n∏
i=1
P(λNi) (1)
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Concept Notation Concept Notation Concept Notation
an activity ω a user who wants P the probability of P(λ)
to achieve an activity an event
a node N a path σ a system α
trust in a node value t(N) trust in a path value t(σ) trust in a system value t(α)
for an activity for an activity for an activity
the event “N provides λN the event “P λσ the event “P λα
the expected services achieves an activity achieves an activity
for an activity” through the path σ” through the system”
For a given activity ω achieved by a person P , the symbols ω, P are omitted for simplicity if there is no ambiguity
Table 1: List of symbols and notations
3.2.2 Trust in a system (formal evaluation): The trust level of a person P in a
system α to achieve an activity is the probability that she achieves her activity through
one of the paths in the system. To evaluate the trust in a system for an activity, two
cases have to be considered: (1) the paths are independent i.e., they have no nodes in
common and (2) the paths are dependent i.e., there exists at least one node in common.
The following shows how we use probability theory for these two cases.
1. Independent paths:
Let {σi}i∈[1..m] be independent paths that enable a person P to achieve an activity.
The probability of achieving the activity through a system,P(λα), is the probability
of achieving the activity through one of the paths σi. Thus P(λα) is computed as
follows:
P(λα) = P(λσ1 ∨ λσ2 ∨ . . . ∨ λσm)
Since the paths are independent then the equation can be rewritten as follows:
P(λα) = 1−
m∏
i=1
(1−P(λσi))
For instance, if a person has two independent paths to achieve an activity then:
P(λα) = P(λσ1 ∨ λσ2) = 1− (1−P(λσ1))× (1−P(λσ2))
= P(λσ1) +P(λσ2)−P(λσ1)×P(λσ2) (2)
2. Dependent paths: To evaluate the trust through dependent paths, we begin from a
simple case where a system has two paths before generalizing.
2.1. Two dependent paths with one common node: Let σ1, σ2, be two paths that
enable a person P to achieve an activity. σ1 = {N,N1,2, . . . , N1,n}, σ2 =
{N,N2,2, . . . , N2,m}. These two paths have a common node, which is N and
so they are dependent. Thus the probability that a person P achieves the activity
ω through the system α is computed as follows:
P(λα) = P(λσ1 ∨ λσ2) = P(λσ1) +P(λσ2)−P(λσ1 ∧ λσ2)
The probabilityP(λσ1 ∧λσ2) can be rewritten using conditional probability as
the two paths are dependent.
P(λα) = P(λσ1) +P(λσ2)−P(λσ2)×P(λσ1 |λσ2)
= P(λσ1) +P(λσ2)× (1−P(λσ1 |λσ2))
We have to compute P(λσ1 |λσ2) which is the probability that P achieves
the activity through σ1 once it is already known that P achieves the activity
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through σ2. Thus it is the probability that N , {N1,i}i∈[1..n] provide the ex-
pected services for this activity, once it is known that N , {N2,i}i∈[1..m] pro-
vided the expected services. Thus N has already provided the expected ser-
vices. Hence, P(λσ1 |λσ2) = ∏ni=2P(λN1,i), where λN1,i is the event “N1,i
provides the necessary services for the activity”.
P(λα) = P(λN )×
n∏
i=2
P(λN1,i) +P(λN )×
m∏
i=2
P(λN2,i)× (1−
n∏
i=2
P(λN1,i))
= P(λN )×
[
n∏
i=2
P(λN1,i) +
m∏
i=2
P(λN2,i)× (1−
n∏
i=2
P(λN1,i))
]
= P(λN )×
[
n∏
i=2
P(λN1,i) +
m∏
i=2
P(λN2,i)−
m∏
i=2
P(λN2,i)×
n∏
i=2
P(λN1,i)
]
From Equation 2 we can note that the term:
n∏
i=2
P(λN1,i) +
m∏
i=2
P(λN2,i)−
m∏
i=2
P(λN2,i)×
n∏
i=2
P(λN1,i)
is the probability that P achieves the activity through σ′1 = {N1,2, . . . , N1,n}
or σ′2 = {N2,2, . . . , N2,m} which are the paths after eliminating the common
nodes. Thus the previous equation can be rewritten as follows:
P(λα) = P(λN )×P(λσ′1 ∨ λσ′2)
2.2. Two dependent paths with several common nodes: Let σ1, σ2, be two paths
that enable a person P to achieve an activity. These two paths have several com-
mon nodes. By following the same logic as in 2.1., we compute the probability
that a person P achieves activity ω through system α as follows:
P(λα) =
∏
N∈σ1∩σ2
P(λN )×P(λσ′1 ∨ λσ′2) : σ′1 = σ1 \ σ2, σ′2 = σ2 \ σ1.
2.3. Several dependent paths: A person may have several paths l with common
nodes.
P(λα) = P(λσ1 ∨ λσ2 ∨ . . . ∨ λσl) =
P(λσ1∨λσ2∨. . .∨λσl−1)+P(λσl)−P(λσl)×P(λσ1∨λσ2∨. . .∨λσl−1 |λσl)
(3)
Let us discuss these terms one by one:
– P(λσl) can be computed directly from Equation 1.
– P(λσ1 ∨ λσ2 ∨ . . . ∨ λσl−1) can be computed recursively using Equation 3.
– P(λσ1 ∨ λσ2 ∨ . . . ∨ λσl−1 |λσl) needs first to be simplified. If we follow
the same logic we discussed in Section (2.1.), the term P(λσ1 ∨ λσ2 ∨ . . . ∨
λσl−1 |λσl) can be replaced by the term P(λσ′1 ∨ λσ′2 ∨ . . . ∨ λσ′l−1) where
we obtain each λσ
′
i by eliminating the nodes in common with σl.
– P(λσ
′
1 ∨ λσ′2 ∨ . . . ∨ λσ′l−1) can be computed recursively using Equation 3,
and recursion is guaranteed to terminate when the number of paths is finite.
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α tω(α) α tω(α)
α1
A F
E
D
B
toto
C
0.4409 α2
A B
C
D F
toto
E
0.0144
α3
A B C
D F
toto
E
0.507 α4
A B C
D
F
toto
E
0.9003
Table 2: Different systems and their trust value
4 Experimental evaluations
This section presents different experiments, their results, analysis and interpretation.
The main objectives are (i) to study the influence of the system organization on the trust
values, and (ii) to confront this approach with real users. The first two experiments are
related to the first objective while the third experiment is devoted to the second.
4.1 Influence of the system architecture on the trust value
SOCIOTRUST is motivated by the hypothesis that studying trust in the separate
nodes that construct a system does not give an accurate picture of the trustworthi-
ness of the system as a whole. To validate this hypothesis, we apply our equations
on different systems that have the same number of nodes A,B,C,D,E,F and the
same values of trust assigned to each node, but assembled in different topologies as
presented in Table 2. The values of trust associated to nodes A,B,C,D,E,F are
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7 respectively. We calculate the trust value tω(α) of each sys-
tem. We obtain very divergent results varying from 0.0144 to 0.9003 as illustrated in
Table 2. Collecting the values of trust in each separated node in a system is not enough
to determine if the system is trustworthy or not for an activity. One must also know how
the system is organized. For example, in α2, all the paths contain the nodes A and B and
the trust values in these nodes is quite low, 0.1 and 0.2 respectively, so the system trust
value is also low due to the strong dependency on these two nodes.
4.2 Influence of the path length and the number of paths on the trust value
We conducted several simulations to observe the evolution of the trust value for
an activity according to some characteristics in the graph. As a dataset, we considered
random graphs composed of 20 to 100 nodes, and of 1 to 15 paths. Each node in the
graph is associated with a random value of trust from a predefined range.
Firstly, the evolution of trust values according to the path lengths in a graph is
evaluated. Each simulated graph is composed of 5 paths with lengths varying from 1 to
15 nodes. Different ranges of trust values towards the nodes were simulated, namely:
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Fig. 3: System trust value according to the
length of paths
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Path numbers
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t(N)∈[0.6,0.9]
t(N)∈[0.5,0.8]
t(N)∈[0.1,0.3]
t(N)∈[0.1,0.9]
Fig. 4: System trust value according to the
number of paths
[0.1, 0.4], [0.4, 0.6], [0.6, 0.9] and [0.1, 0.9]. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the path
lengths on the trust value. Note that, the system trust value decreases when the length of
paths increases. This reflects the natural intuition that the measure of trust in a path falls
as the path gets longer, which is coherent with most of the existing results [12,13,14].
Secondly, we set the path lengths to 5 nodes and we increased the number of paths
from 1 up to 15 in order to observe the variation of the trust values. Again, different
node trust values were simulated: [0.1, 0.3], [0.5, 0.8], [0.6, 0.9], [0.7, 0.9] and [0.1, 0.9].
Simulation results are reported in Figure 4 which show that the trust value increases as
the number of paths increase. This reflects the intuition that the measure of trust in a
system for an activity rises when the number of ways to achieve this activity increases.
4.3 Social evaluation: a real case
In order to evaluate SOCIOTRUST in a real use case, we modeled a subpart of the
LINA research laboratory system 3 using SOCIOPATH. We applied the rules of SO-
CIOPATH on this system for the activity “a user accesses a document toto that is
stored on the SVN server at LINA”. Due to space constraints and privacy issues, Fig-
ure 5 presents only the WDAG of LINA for this activity, with anonymous nodes. We
recall that each node represents a software that is controlled by persons and supported
by physical resources. For the sake of clarity, we simplify the underlying graph as much
as possible. Based on this context, we conducted an opinion survey among twenty mem-
bers of LINA including, PhD students, professors and computer technicians about their
level of trust in each node. The survey allows to infer values of function f (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1) given by real users. For each person, we have computed the system trust value
according to the methodology presented in Section 3. Table 3 presents The survey data
and the computed trust value in the system according to LINA members. Over a second
phase, we asked each user for feedback about the system trust values computed with
respect to their level of trust in the nodes. The last column of Table 3 shows this feed-
back, where X means that they are satisfied with the value, and × means that they are
not satisfied. 75% of the users are satisfied with the computation. Unsatisfied users ar-
gue that they expect a higher trust value. The node trust values of the unsatisfied users,
3. https://www.lina.univ-nantes.fr/
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A
B
toto
E
P
C
G
D
F
Fig. 5: LINA’s WDAG for the activity “accessing a document toto on the SVN”
A B C D E F G System trust User’s feedback about the
value system trust value
P1 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.4375 X
P2 0.7 1 1 0.7 0.7 1 1 0.847 X
P3 0.5 0.5 1 0.7 0.5 1 1 0.4375 ×
P4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.3072 ×
P5 0.8 0.8 1 0.8 0.8 1 0.9 0.8202 X
P6 0.9 0.9 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9043 X
P7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.2770 ×
P8 0.8 0.6 1 0.9 0.8 0.8 1 0.7416 X
P9 0.7 0.5 1 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.4407 X
P10 0.8 1 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6975 X
P11 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.2473 ×
P12 0.95 0.95 0.8 0.8 0.95 0.95 0.8 0.8655 X
P13 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.95 0.8 0.7 0.6433 X
P14 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6652 X
P15 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7733 X
P16 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.337 X
P17 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.3807 ×
P18 0.7 0.7 1 0.7 0.6 0.7 1 0.6088 X
P19 0.8 0.8 1 1 1 0.8 1 0.8704 X
P20 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7971 X
Table 3: User’s trust value in the system SVN in LINA
have relatively low values (around 0.5 or 0.6) compared to the other users. These users
explain that the lack of knowledge about some nodes leads them to vote with a neutral
value (0.5 or 0.6) which for them considered neither trustworthy, nor untrustworthy.
Clearly, such behavior is not compatible with a probabilistic interpretation where 0.5
is no more neutral than any other possible value. The explanations provided by users
reveal an interesting point; even in the case of a local environment and even consid-
ering advanced users, not everyone is in possession of all the information necessary
for an informed assessment. To conform to this reality and model this phenomenon, it
requires to use a formalism allowing to express uncertainty related to incompleteness
of available information. Classical probability theory is limited in expressing ignorance
or uncertainty while subjective logic [15] was proposed to deal with this issue. In our
future work we plan to extend SOCIOTRUST to use subjective logic.
5 Related Work
This paper proposes SOCIOTRUST, an approach to evaluate the system trust value
for an activity as a combination of several trust values through a graph. This work is
related to two domains: social networks and service-oriented computing (SOC).
Usually, a social network is represented as a graph where the nodes are persons
and the edges reflect the relations between these persons. The values associated to the
edges represent the value of trust between these persons. Trust propagation problem in
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social network focuses on finding a trust value toward a defined person or resource
through the multiple paths that relate the trustor with the trustee. A lot of metrics
have been proposed to calculate this trust value like the one of Richardson et al. [16],
the TidalTrust [14], the SUNNY algorithm [17], the work of Agudo et al. [18]. SO-
CIOTRUST converges with these works on some points like navigating on the graph
between the source and the target to collect the values of trust and combining these
values to obtain the general trust value but it diverges in other points like, the values of
trust associated to each node in our work are values attributed by the source node which
represent her trust in these nodes. In their works, the values associated to the edges rep-
resent the trust between the nodes related with this edge. Hence, these works discuss the
problem of trust propagation through a graph, while SOCIOTRUST focuses on finding a
trust value toward the whole graph that reflects an activity performed through it.
In SOC, a service invokes other services forming a composite service, so the com-
posite service can be represented as a graph where the nodes represent the service com-
ponents and the edges represent the relation of invocation. In [13,19,9], authors evaluate
the trust toward the composite service by considering the value of trust as probability
depending on the definition presented in [4]. They calculate a global trust value toward
the separated services and they use the theory of probability to evaluate the global trust
value of the composite services. These works are similar to our proposal in some points.
Firstly, the value associated to a node in the graph is represents the value of trust toward
a service. Secondly, they consider this value as a probability that the node performs
a given action that enables a user to achieve her activity. However, they diverge from
SOCIOTRUST in a main point. In their work, the computed trust value is toward a cer-
tain choice (path) of the composite services where in our work, it is toward the whole
system including all the paths that enable a user to achieve an activity.
The trust evaluation proposed in these two domains cannot be straightly adopted in
our work due to the difference in the graph nature between their works and ours.
6 Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper, we present a new notion of trust: trust in a system for an activity.
We propose SOCIOTRUST, a probabilistic approach to calculate the system trust value.
We conduct some experiments to illustrate that the system construction is a key factor
in evaluating the user trust value in a system. Finally, we confront our approach with
real user opinions based on a real modeled system to extract the limitations of this
proposition. A serious limitation of our study is that trust values have been considered
as a traditional probability where expressing ignorance or uncertainty is not possible.
Subjective logic which is an extension of probability theory can deal with this issue. We
are currently extending SOCIOTRUST to use subjective logic.
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